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1 Introduction
Since the Great Depression, the size of U.S. government has grown consistently. While most
focus is traditionally on the expansion of the federal government, Figure 1 illustrates the
significant role played by the states in this transformation. The size of state government
measured as state expenditures divided by total government expenditures increased from
eighteen percent in 1960 to a peak of twenty-nine percent in 2001. Similarly, state expen-
ditures divided by GDP increased from about four percent in 1960 to ten percent in 2009.
As is fitting in a federalist economy, much of the growth in the states concerns local pub-
lic goods such as education, law and order, social transfers (welfare programs), and health
expenditures. Voters pay close attention to these programs since they directly affect their
lives. Furthermore, there are significant differences in policy preferences between Republi-
cans and Democrats concerning these budget items – of which both voters and politicians
are highly conscious. In general, the consensus view is that Republicans favor smaller gov-
ernment (lower taxes and spending), while Democrats prefer a larger role for government
(higher taxes and spending).
These observations raise the question: what role does partisanship play in U.S. state fiscal
policy making? When a state has either a unified Republican or Democratic government, are
fiscal policies different? Recent research has shown that a lack of political competition may,
indeed, have deleterious effects on growth (Besley et al., 2010). If so, is it possible to reduce
these partisan policy outcomes using laws, such as restrictions on the ability to carry a budget
deficit into the next fiscal year? Finally, if such laws do effectively constrain partisan fiscal
policy choices, do politicians simply appeal to their constituencies through other legislative
endeavors, such as regulatory policy? This last point is particularly important since it holds
important implications for constitutional design. If we wish to limit government activism
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using constitutional constraints, then we would like to know if these constraints simply shift
activity from one area of government (fiscal policy) to another (regulatory policy). If they
do, then it may be more prudent to pursue alternative policies to limit government.
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Figure 1: The growth in state and local government, 1960-2010.
We use panel data on U.S. state fiscal and regulatory policies between 1970 and 2010 to
answer these questions. We begin by identifying a strong effect of political parties on state
policy outcomes. Previous research has found either little effect of unified party control
(Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995; Garand, 1988) or that Democratic control tends to increase
taxes and spending (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Reed, 2006). In particular, Reed (2006) estimates
that state government is about three to five percent larger after five years of Democratic
control of the legislature. We adopt the basic identification strategy of Reed (2006), but
unlike his study which focuses on just one dependent variable, “Tax Burden” (the ratio of
state and local tax revenues to state personal income) our study looks at five state revenue
policies and five expenditure policies. What emerges is a more nuanced picture of party
activism. We find ample evidence for policy preferences, especially for the Republicans.
When Republicans control both the legislature and governorship, six out of ten fiscal policy
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variables are significantly affected. We conclude that parties definitely use state fiscal policies
to appeal to their voter base.
We next examine whether the partisan policy preferences decrease or even disappear in
the presence of laws designed to constrain the size of government. We focus on “no-carry”
restrictions, which limit the ability of the government to carry a deficit into the next fiscal
year. The literature on the effects of these budget rules is large (see Drazen (2004), and Rose
(2006), for a review). We find that no-carry budget rules do constrain state partisanship.
Republicans in states with no-carry restrictions are unable to cut taxes and spending as
much as their fellow party members who face no restrictions. In fact, Republican control is
only significant for two fiscal policies under no-carry budget rules. Similarly, Democrats in
states with no-carry restrictions are unable to cut law and order and capital expenditures
as much as their fellow party members who face no restrictions. But does this mean that
politicians in no-carry states turn into statesmen and stop trying to legislate in favor of their
voter base?
The final stage of our investigation seeks to answer this question by looking at whether politi-
cians engage in offsetting behavior in the presence of binding budget rules. In particular,
we compare the regulatory environment in states with and without no-carry rules, holding
constant the amount of unified government. We find that such laws tend to lead to off-
setting partisan behavior along the regulatory dimension: when Democrats cannot increase
spending, they regulate more and when Republicans cannot cut spending, they regulate less.
Before we present our empirical results, we develop a simple theoretical model of fiscal
constraint. We show that if voters view regulatory and fiscal policies as inseparable and
if a fiscal constraint binds spending policy to some level between the universal ideal of
Republicans and Democrats, then the constraint will result in more-partisan regulatory
policies.
3
2 Theoretical Model
Public finance scholars have long recognized the inherent substitutability of fiscal and regu-
latory policy instruments. As Wagner (1989, 108) has put it, “a central principle of public
finance is that any statute or regulation can be translated into a budgetary equivalent.” In
the simple model that follows, we incorporate voter recognition that fiscal and regulatory
policy can be substitutes for one another. We then examine the impact of a fiscal policy
constraint, such as a strict balanced budget requirement, on both fiscal and regulatory policy
platforms.
There are two separate primary elections (Republican and Democratic) with two candidates
in each (R1, R2 and D1, D2). Each primary candidate adopts a platform in a three-policy
space which includes positions on government spending (S), taxation (T ), and regulation
(L). Larger numbers of each value represent more activity along that dimension, i.e., more
regulation, more taxation, or more spending. Compared with Democrats, Republicans favor
lower levels of spending, taxation and regulation.
We define a three-policy vector as P = [S, T, L]′. Letting the superscript represent the
candidate and the subscript represent the voter, the policy platform of candidate C is PC =
[SC , TC , LC ]′ and the ideal policy vector of voter v is Pˆv = [Sˆv, Tˆv, Lˆv]′.
The utility that each voter gets from a candidate’s policy platform is a negative function
of the distance between the voter’s ideal policy vector Pˆv and the policy platform of the
candidate PC :
UCv = distance(Pˆv −PC) (1)
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We assume that this distance takes a weighted Euclidian distance equal to the following:
distance(Pˆv −PC) =
√√√√√√√√√√√√
α(Sˆv − SC)2 + β(Tˆv − TC)2 + γ(Lˆv − LC)2
+2δ(Sˆv − SC)(Lˆv − LC)
+2λ(Tˆv − TC)(Lˆv − LC)
+2µ(Sˆv − SC)(Tˆv − TC)
(2)
The parameters α, β and γ are, respectively, the salience terms for spending, taxation,
and regulation. By definition they are nonnegative. The parameters δ, λ, and µ are the
interaction terms which indicate the voter’s conditional preference for one policy based on
the value taken by anther policy. If any of these terms equals zero, the value of one policy
does not affect the voter’s preferences for another and the two issues are said to be separable.
In this case, the indifference curves between the issues will be circular. If, on the other hand,
any of these terms takes a value other than zero, then the value of one policy changes
the voter’s preference for the other issue and the issues are not separable. In this case,
the indifference curves between the two issues will be oblong and tilted. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that spending and taxation are separable so that µ = 0.1
Assumption 1: We assume that δ > 0 and λ > 0. This implies negative complementarity
between spending and regulation and negative complementarity between taxation and reg-
ulation. The idea is that if fiscal and regulatory policy are substitutes for one another, then
as the state regulates more, voters will prefer that it tax and spend less. This assumption
holds for both Democrats and Republicans.
As a result of Assumption 1 the indifference curves of voters will appear as they do in Figure
2. The tilted indifference curves indicate conditional preferences. In panels A and B, we
see that upon the condition of less-than-ideal taxation and spending, Democrats will prefer
1This assumption does not affect the analysis.
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a greater level of regulation. And in panels C and D, we see that upon the condition of
greater-than-ideal taxation and spending, Republicans will prefer a lower level of regulation.
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Figure 2: Conditional Preferences with Negative Complementarity
The task of candidate C1 seeking his partys nomination in the primary is to maximize his
expected vote function EV C1 =
∑n
v=1 pi
C1
v where pi
C1
v is the probability candidate C1 will
win voter v’s vote. Following the large literature on probabilistic voting, we assume piC1v
is a smooth, continuous, concave function of the utility that the voter receives from that
candidate’s platform UC1v as well as the utility she would receive from the other primary
candidate’s platform UC2v .
2 Coughlin and Nitzan (1981a,b) have shown that if individual
2The approach was originally developed by Hinich et al. (1969, 1971) but it has seen many refinements.
See the overview by Mueller (2003, 249-254). We have assumed that there are only two candidates in each
primary in order to simplify the analysis. Wittman (1984), however, has shown that equilibrium may be
obtained in probabilistic vote models with more than two candidates.
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probabilities take the form piC1v =
U
C1
v
U
C1
v +U
C2
v
, then an equilibrium will obtain in which pri-
mary candidates will adopt platforms at the peak of their party’s aggregate expected vote
function. Therefore, if individual primary voters are normally distributed about some point
(Sˆv, Tˆv, Lˆv), then the contours of the aggregate expected vote function will follow a pattern
similar to the weighted Euclidian distance function of equation 2 above.
Assumption 2: We assume that some institutional constraint such as a “no-carry” require-
ment pushes taxation up and spending down. Moreover, we assume that taxation is pushed
to some level, T¯ , which is more than the ideal taxing level of the median Republican voter,
but no greater than the ideal taxing level of the median Democratic voter (TˆR < T¯ < TˆD).
Similarly, spending is pushed to some level, S¯, which is less than the ideal spending level
of the median Democratic voter, but no less than the ideal spending level of the median
Republican voter (SˆR < S¯ < SˆD). Since the constraint itself is selected by politicians, our
intuition is that they will not adopt a constraint which pushes taxation to a level that is
more than even high-tax-preferring Democrats want. Nor will they adopt a constraint which
pushes spending below what even low-spending Republicans want.
Under the fiscal constraint, each candidate will no longer be able to position herself at the
center of the expected vote function. Instead, she will be bound to the lines traced out
by S¯ and T¯ in Figure 2. Each candidate will therefore select a level of regulation L¯v that
minimizes (2), constrained by S¯ and T¯ . As a result, the ideal Republican regulatory policy
under the constraints S¯ and T¯ shifts down to L¯R, while the ideal Democratic regulatory
policy under the constraints S¯ and T¯ shifts up to L¯D.
3
We can also demonstrate this result mathematically. Let the distance between the voter’s
3In order to show the effect of the constraints in two dimensions, the two left panels in Figure 2 depict
the tradeoff between taxation and regulation, holding spending constant while the right panels show the
tradeoff between spending and regulation, holding taxation constant. Obviously, the two effects reinforce
one another.
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ideal spending level, Sˆv, and the institutional constraint, S¯v, be σ = Sˆv − S¯v. Similarly,
let the distance between the voter’s ideal tax level, Tˆv, and the institutional constraint, T¯v,
be θ = Tˆv − T¯v. The “weighted Euclidian distance” functional form under the constraint
becomes:
distance(Pˆv −PC) =
√√√√√√√√√
ασ2 + βθ2 + γ(Lˆv − LC)2
+2δσ(Lˆv − LC)
+2λθ(Lˆv − LC)
(3)
where µ = 0 and the parameters α, β and γ are nonnegative by definition. Assumption 1
implies that δ > 0 and λ > 0 for both parties. Assumption 2 implies that σ > 0 and θ > 0
for Democrats and σ < 0 and θ < 0 for Republicans. Taking the derivative with respect to
LC and setting equal to zero, we obtain:
LC ≡ L¯C = δσ + λθ
γ
+ Lˆv (4)
From (4) it is clear that Democratic candidates (for whom σ > 0 and θ > 0) will select a
regulatory platform that involves more regulation than otherwise and Republican candidates
(for whom σ < 0 and θ < 0) will select a regulatory platform that involves less regulation
than otherwise.
In summary, we have two testable predictions. First, in states where Democrats control the
legislative process, a fiscal constraint will induce the adoption of relatively more regulation
than otherwise. Second, in states where Republicans control the legislative process, a fiscal
constraint will induce the adoption of relatively less regulation. In the next sections, we test
these two predictions using U.S. state-level data. We first establish that partisan prefer-
ences over fiscal policy exist. Then, we exploit the institutional variation across states with
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regard to constraints on budget deficits to establish that partisan fiscal preferences can be
constrained. Finally, we investigate whether unified Democratic or Republican governments
in states with binding budget rules pursue more active regulatory policies to offset their
inability to affect fiscal policy.
3 Partisan Fiscal Policy Preferences
We use panel data on U.S. state fiscal policy, economic and demographic conditions, and
partisan control for 1970 through 2010. Our dependent variables are five measures of state
taxation and five measures of state spending. Each dependent variable is measured in $1,000
per person. The revenue measures are: General Revenue, Total Taxes, Sales Taxes, Personal
Income Taxes, and Corporate Income Taxes. The expenditure measures are: General Ex-
penditures, Education Expenditures, Welfare Expenditures, Law & Order Expenditures and
Capital Expenditures. Following Bohn and Inman (1996) and Rose (2006), we use the gen-
eral fund rather than the total budget since it is the principal source of state appropriations
and as a result the fund directly constrained by balanced budget requirements.4
We measure partisan control as Democratic and Republican control of both the legislature
and governorship, with the omitted category being split control. Previous work by Alt and
Lowry (1994, 2000) has found that partisan control of both branches of state government is
more strongly correlated with fiscal actions than individual control of each branch. Nebraska
is excluded from the data since state legislators do not formally affiliate with parties. We
also follow convention and exclude Alaska due to its location and resource-dependence.5
We include several variables to control for economic, demographic, fiscal, and political fac-
4The general fund is also the part of the budget legislators have the mose discretion over. The total fund
includes insurance trust funds, federal funds, public employee retirement funds, and other special funds;
while the general fund does not.
5See, for example, Shadbegian (1996), Besley and Case (2003), and Primo (2007).
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tors. The economic variables are Real Personal Income per Worker, Unemployment Rate,
Unionization Rate, Real Wage Rate in Manufacturing, Percent Earnings from Manufac-
turing, and Percent Earnings from Agriculture. The demographic variables are Percent of
Population Female, Percent of Population Black, Percent of Population 0-17 Years Old,
Percent of Population 65+ Years Old, and Log Population Density. The fiscal variables
are the lags of Budget Deficit and Federal Transfers. The political variables are a dummy
for a Lame Duck Governor and indices of Citizen Ideology and Government Ideology. The
ideology indices are updated versions of Berry et al. (1998).
There is no one singular budget process for U.S. states. More than half of the states operate
on an annual budget cycle where the legislature provides appropriations for one fiscal year.
The majority of the remaining states use a biennial budget cycle with a few following a
combination of biennial and annual cycles. To complicate matters further, some biennial
states have legislatures that meet only on budget years, while others have legislatures that
meet every year with the option to revise the current budget. Therefore, to avoid making
restrictive and potentially erroneous assumptions concerning the exact timing between leg-
islative actions and fiscal policy measures, we aggregate the annual observations for each
state into four-year election cycles.6 As a result, the final data set contains 480 observations
on forty-eight states over ten election cycles.7
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our fiscal policy variables. The means and
standard deviations of each variable are shown for the full, Unified Democratic, Unified
Republican and Split samples. The fiscal policy variables are measured in terms of $1,000
dollars per person. Thus, the values of 2.5642 and 2.5217 for general revenue and general
6Of the forty-eight states, seven hold elections during the presidential cycle, two hold elections one year
after the presidential cycle, thirty-three hold elections two years after the presidential cycle, three hold
elections three years after the presidential cycle, and three hold elections every two years.
7Law & Order Expenditures and Capital Expenditures are only available at the state level consistently
from 1977 onwards. As a result, these regressions contain nine election cycles x forty-eight states = 432
observations.
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expenditures for the full sample are interpreted as the average U.S. citizen paid $2,564 in
general revenue (taxes, licenses and fees) and received $2,522 in state expenditures.   
     
Variable Full Sample 
Unified 
Democratic 
Unified 
Republican Split 
General Revenue 2.5642 2.1601 2.7507 2.7801 
 (1.6804) (1.5976) (1.4277) (1.7773) 
Total Taxes 1.3094 1.1385 1.3185 1.4271 
 (0.7929) (0.7504) (0.6456) (0.8516) 
Sales Taxes 0.6198 0.5583 0.6735 0.6430 
 (0.3921) (0.3768) (0.3449) (0.4149) 
Ind. Income Taxes 0.3777 0.3237 0.3346 0.4322 
 (0.3365) (0.2983) (0.2975) (0.3672) 
Corp. Income Taxes 0.0805 0.0695 0.0803 0.0884 
 (0.0774) (0.0602) (0.0717) (0.0889) 
General Expenditures 2.5217 2.1268 2.7052 2.7321 
 (1.6516) (1.6041) (1.3759) (1.7338) 
Education Expenditures 0.9158 0.7726 1.0019 0.9846 
 (0.5911) (0.5453) (0.5363) (0.6248) 
Law & Order Expenditures 0.5781 0.4854 0.5982 0.6361 
 (0.4828) (0.4829) (0.3728) (0.5106) 
Welfare Expenditures 0.0982 0.0804 0.1063 0.1074 
 (0.0743) (0.0680) (0.0642) (0.0798) 
Capital Expenditures 0.2255 0.1940 0.2626 0.2333 
 (0.1424) (0.1330) (0.1468) (0.1432) 
Observations 480 163 87 230 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for fiscal policy variables. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Sources: Census Bureau, State Government Finances.
Perhaps the most interesting fact to emerge from Table 1 comes from looking at the means
of the policy variables under either unified Democratic or Republican governments. Bluntly
stated, in levels, Democratic policy looks very similar to Republican policy and vice versa.
General revenue (and all the sub-categories of taxation) are lower in states with unified Demo-
cratic governments than in those with unified Republican governments. Likewise, General
expenditures and its sub-components are all lower under unified Democratic governments.
One possible explanation for this pattern is that Democrats and Republicans do not act in
accordance with our priors. Alternatively, a more likely interpretation is that voters elect
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either Democratic or Republican governments to do exactly what we expect them to do. If
voters think that state spending and taxation is too high, they elect Republican politicians
whom they expect to shrink the size of government. Likewise, if citizens perceive that state
spending is too low on public goods, then they elect Democrats. The key question is not
what is the value of the level of state policies under different political parties, but what is
the subsequent change in fiscal policy resulting from the changing partisanship of a state’s
government.
We examine this change in policy using a difference-in-differences regression. Letting s
represent the state and t denote the cycle period, we estimate the following panel regression:
τst = α + βDDemocraticst + βRRepublicanst +
∑
j
γjStateV ariablej,st + δs + λt + νst (5)
The dependent variable τst is our fiscal policy measure. Democraticst and Republicanst
are the percentage of the four-year election cycle with Democratic or Republican control
of state government.8 The coefficient βD (βR) is interpreted as the fiscal policy impact of
Democratic (Republican) control of state government relative to the omitted category, split
control. StateV ariablej,st is a vector of economic, demographic and fiscal controls listed in
Appendix A. The next two terms, δs and λt, are state fixed effects and time fixed effects to
control for omitted state factors and the national business cycle, respectively. Lastly, νst is
an i.i.d. error term.
Our hypothesis is that βD > 0 and βR < 0 for most revenue and expenditure policies.
The prediction that Democratic governments will raise revenue and taxes to fund higher
spending has found support in the work by Alt and Lowry (1994), Caplan (2001) and Reed
(2006). For the revenue sub-categories, we expect that Republicans will want lower tax rates
8Although the majority of the values for Democratic and Republican are zero or one, values of 0.25, 0.50,
and 0.75 did occur when a party lost its majority in the middle of an election cycle.
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relative to split control of government, while Democrats will raise tax rates to fund higher
expenditures. The one possible exception is that Democrats may prefer lower sales tax rates
for their lower income constituents. For expenditure sub-groups, we expect that Democrats
prefer higher spending on education and welfare, while Republicans desire lower spending
on these categories. We also expect that Republicans want higher spending on law & order
and capital, while Democrats want to lower spending on these items.9
Table 2 presents the estimation results of (5) with revenue policies in Panel A and expen-
diture policies in Panel B. For brevity, we present only the coefficient values and standard
errors for the political parameters βD and βR. The results are broadly in line with our politi-
cal preference hypotheses, especially for Republicans. Unified Republican governments lower
general revenue and total taxes by $181 and $190 per capita on average over the four-year
election cycle. In particular, Republicans cut individual income taxes by $70 per capita over
the cycle. For expenditure policy, Republicans cut general spending by $172 per capita, lower
welfare spending by $73 per capita, but raise capital spending by $22 per capita. Although
not significant at the ten percent level, the coefficient signs for the Unified Democratic gov-
ernment are consistent with the idea that Democratic state governments raise taxes, increase
spending on education and welfare, but decrease law & order and capital expenditures.
4 The Effect of No-Carry Laws on Partisan Fiscal Policy
Our next task is to investigate whether the partisan policy preferences can be constrained by
political institutions. Previous work on the effect of fiscal rules across the U.S. states tends
to focus on the overall effect of the various constraints on budget balance. Notable examples
include von Hagen (1991), Bohn and Inman (1996), Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994),
9In a related work, Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) did find evidence that Democratic state governments
spend more on public welfare and less on capital expenditures.
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Panel A: Revenue Policies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES General 
Revenue 
Total Tax Sales Tax Individual 
Income Tax 
Corp. 
Income Tax 
      
Unified Democratic 0.0272 0.0427 -0.0050 0.0340 0.0068 
 (0.0551) (0.0456) (0.0321) (0.0329) (0.0083) 
      
Unified Republican -0.1811** -0.1895** -0.0267 -0.0695* -0.0113 
 (0.0834) (0.0743) (0.0385) (0.0350) (0.0130) 
      
Observations 480 480 480 420 440 
Number of States 48 48 48 42 44 
Time Period 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 
R-squared 0.980 0.944 0.899 0.877 0.595 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: Expenditure Policies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES General   
Exp. 
Education 
Exp. 
Welfare   
Exp. 
Law & 
Order Exp. 
Capital    
Exp. 
      
Unified Democratic 0.0026 -0.0218 0.0443 -0.0069 -0.0186 
 (0.0490) (0.0337) (0.0324) (0.0063) (0.0132) 
      
Unified Republican -0.1715* -0.0818 -0.0725* 0.0061 0.0224* 
 (0.0882) (0.0527) (0.0415) (0.0086) (0.0119) 
      
Observations 480 480 480 432 432 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48 
Time Period 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 1977-10 1977-10 
R-squared 0.980 0.953 0.958 0.924 0.826 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 Table 2: Equation (5) is estimated with the fiscal policy listed on top as the dependent variable.
The coefficient for Unified party p is βp. The coefficients for the intercept term, control variables
and time dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and
‘*’ indicate significance at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively.
Crain (2003), and Primo (2007). They all generally find that fiscal rules lead to lower deficits
and less spending. Bohn and Inman (1996) test the effectiveness of a wide variety of rules
with different requirements and enforcement characteristics and find that no-carry provisions
are the most effective in generating large general fund surpluses. Since one of our primary
interests is the potential offsetting behavior of fiscal constraints rather than the effectiveness
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of a broad range of rules we follow Rose (2006) in focusing on no-carry rules.
Figure 3: No-Carry and Carry-Over States. Nebraska and Alaska not included as they are
excluded from our data.
No-carry rules combine what Bohn and Inman refer to as “proscriptive” rules on the size of
the budget, with more stringent “retrospective” rules that prevent a state from “carrying” a
deficit into the next fiscal year. At present, twenty-eight states have no-carry rules. Figure 3
shows the distribution of the no-carry and carry-over states. As the map makes clear, there
are no obvious patterns in which states have adopted these fiscal restrictions. Rose (2006)
argues that these, and most other balanced-budget requirements, are exogenous since their
adoption was largely based on historical accident. Indeed, with the exception of Tennessee
who adopted their rules in 1977, most states adopted their no-carry restrictions in their
original constitutions (Savage, 1990).
We identify the constraining effect of no-carry restrictions on partisan governments by adding
interaction terms to specification (5). The resulting equation becomes:
τst = α + βDDemocraticst + βRRepublicanst + φDDemocraticst ×NoCarrys
· · ·+ βRRepublicanst ×NoCarrys +
∑
j
γjStateV ariablej,st + δs + λt + νst (6)
where NoCarrys is a dummy variable that is one if a state has a no-carry restriction on its
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budget and zero if a state has the ability to carry-over its deficit.10 The marginal effect of a
unified Democratic or Republican government on policy in (6) is
∂τ
∂PoliticalPartyp
= βp + φp ×NoCarry (7)
Where p indexes the party of interest (Democrat or Republican). Using (7), one can see
that the marginal effect of a unified government under carry-over provisions is βp, while
the marginal effect of a unified government under no-carry restrictions is βp + φp. Brambor
and Golder (2006) show that the calculation of both βp and βp + φp; and their standard
errors (rather than individually reporting βp and φp) is necessary to convey the quantities of
interest.
Our particular interest is to see if no-carry restrictions constrain partisan fiscal policy. We
do so in a series of tests. First, we test if no-carry restrictions reduce partisan fiscal policy.
Given that we expect βD > 0 and βR < 0 for both taxing and spending policies, we test
H0 : βD + φD > 0 and H0 : βR + φR < 0 for all policies except law & order and capital
expenditures where we test the reverse. Second, we test if no-carry restrictions eliminate
partisan fiscal policy H0 : βp + φp = 0.
Tables 3 and 4 present the effects of no-carry restrictions on partisan fiscal policy prefer-
ences identified earlier. Following our previous discussion, we report the point estimate and
standard error of each unified government under carry-over provisions, βp, and the point
estimate and standard error of each unified government under no-carry restrictions, βp +φp.
We also report the p-value of the one-tailed test that no-carry restrictions reduce partisan
fiscal policy.
The results show that no-carry restrictions reduce and in the case of expenditures eliminate
10Because the no-carry restriction is time-invariant, it is absorbed by the state fixed effects and thus not
included as a stand-alone term in the fixed-effects specification.
16
   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES General 
Revenue 
Total Tax Sales Tax Individual 
Income Tax 
Corp. 
Income Tax
      
Unified Democratic -0.0771 -0.0425 -0.0042 -0.0403 -0.0017 
under Carry-over (0.0766) (0.0639) (0.0376) (0.0532) (0.0105) 
Unified Democratic  0.0741 0.0828 -0.00547 0.0663** 0.0115 
under No-Carry (0.0644) (0.0548) (0.0374) (0.0279) (0.0089) 
Unified Democratic Test 0.046 0.052 0.512 0.009 0.121 
      
Unified Republican -0.2267* -0.2351** -0.0269 -0.0885* 0.0024 
under Carry-over (0.1323) (0.1116) (0.0506) (0.0471) (0.0272) 
Unified Republican  -0.1303* -0.1451** -0.0267 -0.0461 -0.0154 
under No-Carry (0.0756) (0.0670) (0.0399) (0.0346) (0.0103) 
Unified Republican Test 0.780 0.807 0.501 0.877 0.227 
      
Observations 480 480 480 420 440 
Number of States 48 48 48 42 44 
Time Period 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 
R-squared 0.980 0.945 0.899 0.881 0.598 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Table 3: Partisan and No-Carry Impact on Revenue Policies. Equation (6) is estimated with
the fiscal policy listed on top as the dependent variable. The coefficient for Unified party p
under Carry-over is βp and the coefficient for Unified party p under No-Carry is βp + φp. The
Unified Democratic Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H0 : βD+φD > 0 and the Unified
Republican Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H0 : βR + φR < 0. The coefficients for
the intercept term, control variables and time dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the one, five and ten percent levels
respectively.
partisan fiscal policy. For revenue policies in Table 3, Republican tax-cutting policies are
reduced, but not eliminated by the no-carry restrictions. In particular, the marginal effect of
Republican tax cutting are higher (in absolute terms) under carry-over than under no-Carry,
but the marginal effects under no-carry are still negative and significant. Democrats, on the
other hand, are more likely to raise revenue and taxes in general and individual income taxes
in specific under the no-carry rules. However, both Republican and Democratic partisan
expenditure preferences are effectively eliminated in Table 4. In each expenditure policy, the
marginal effects of each political party under no-carry restrictions are insignificant although
some were significant under no-carry provisions and in Table 3.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES General   
Exp. 
Education 
Exp. 
Welfare   
Exp. 
Law & 
Order Exp. 
Capital    
Exp. 
      
Unified Democratic -0.0725 -0.0454 0.0346 -0.0181** -0.0340* 
under Carry-over (0.0688) (0.0305) (0.0531) (0.0070) (0.0186) 
Unified Democratic  0.0373 -0.0103 0.0359 -0.0011 -0.0107 
under No-Carry (0.0617) (0.0444) (0.0531) (0.0068) (0.0146) 
Unified Democratic Test 0.104 0.218 0.488 0.994 0.894 
      
Unified Republican -0.2343* -0.1066 -0.0947 0.0090 0.0241 
under Carry-over (0.1296) (0.0776) (0.0676) (0.0114) (0.0216) 
Unified Republican  -0.1209 -0.0638 -0.0755 0.0069 0.0248 
under No-Carry (0.0818) (0.0484) (0.0467) (0.0088) (0.0220) 
Unified Republican Test 0.826 0.718 0.662 0.420 0.513 
      
Observations 480 480 480 432 432 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48 
Time Period 1970-10 1970-10 1970-10 1977-10 1977-10 
R-squared 0.980 0.953 0.948 0.926 0.827 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Table 4: Partisan and No-Carry Impact on Expenditure Policies. Equation (6) is estimated
with the fiscal policy listed on top as the dependent variable. The coefficient for Unified party
p under Carry-over is βp and the coefficient for Unified party p under No-Carry is βp + φp.
The Unified Democratic Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H0 : βD + φD > 0 and
the Unified Republican Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H0 : βR + φR < 0. The
coefficients for the intercept term, control variables and time dummies are not shown. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the one, five and
ten percent levels respectively.
5 Partisan Regulatory Policies
The final question we ask is whether constraining politicians from pursuing partisan fiscal
policies causes them to shift their behavior towards more partisan regulatory outcomes. The
empirical literature is relatively mute on this question. Nonetheless, most theories of regu-
lation assume that the electorate plays at least some role in pressuring politicians to adopt
regulations that conform to their preferences (see, for example, Stigler, 1971; Yandle, 1983;
Becker, 1983). Our reasoning is that politicians have only a limited menu of policy instru-
ments with which to convince voters that they are acting in their interests. One important
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subset of these instruments is fiscal policy. However, there are plenty of other margins politi-
cians can manipulate to get reelected, such as regulatory policy. Our question boils down
to whether – as in the theoretical section above – political actors view regulatory and fiscal
policy as substitutable means to achieve public policy goals. To the extent that we clearly
identify partisan policy preferences and the effect of no-carry restrictions in constraining
fiscal outcomes in the first two sections above, we have a ready-made identification strategy
for answering this query.
We investigate the impact of state partisanship on individual regulatory policies. We focus on
those policies that are quantifiable, legislated by state government, immune from extensive
judicial interpretation, and clearly partisan. We identify four individual labor laws and two
individual social laws that meet these criteria. The four state labor laws are the Minimum
Wage, Closed Union, Minimum Rest Period and Minimum Meal Period. The Minimum
Wage is the minimum wage level passed by each state with the Federal minimum wage
being the floor. Closed Union is a dummy variable which is one if a state allows a “closed
union shop” and zero if a state prohibits it using a right-to-work law.11 The Minimum
Rest Period and Minimum Meal Period are dummy variables indicating whether a state has
explicit minimum requirements on paid rest periods and minimum requirements on paid meal
periods, respectively. The two social policies are No Fault Divorce and Age Gap Provision.
No Fault Divorce is a dummy variable equal to one when the dissolution of marriage in a
state does not require showing of wrong-doing of either party or any evidentiary proceedings
at all. We use the no-fault legislative dates of Vlosky and Monroe (2002) since they are
constructed using an explicit decision rule. The last regulatory policy is state Age Gap
Provisions that legalize teen sexual activity as long as they are close-in-age. In particular,
the Age Gap Provision is the age span in which someone can legally engage in sexual acts
11Although it is more conventional to record a one for a right-to-work state, we adopt the opposite so
that our Closed Union variable has the same direction as the other regulatory measures.
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with a minor. For instance, Connecticut has an age of consent of sixteen and an age gap
provision of two, which means that a sixteen or seventeen year old can legally engage in a
sexual act with a fifteen year old and a fifteen or sixteen year old can legally engage in a
sexual act with a fourteen year old.
We use annual panel data from 1970 to 2009 with two exceptions. First, the Minimum Wage
panel is for 1985-2009 since Maine was the first state (besides Alaska) to legislate a state
minimum wage above the federal level in 1985. Second, the No Fault Divorce sample is for
1970-1989 since Arkansas was the last state to legislate a no-fault law under the criteria of
Vlosky and Monroe (2002).
   
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full Sample No-carry Carry-Over 
Minimum Wage  4.5758 4.6627 4.5137 
(1.1528) (1.2612) (1.0651) 
Closed Union Shop  0.5892 0.7064 0.5055 
(0.4921) (0.4557) (0.5002) 
Rest Break  0.1181 0.2179 0.0467 
(0.3228) (0.4131) (0.2111) 
Meal Break  0.2377 0.3987 0.1227 
(0.4258) (0.4899) (0.3283) 
No Fault Divorce  0.9033 0.9064 0.9011 
(0.2956) (0.2914) (0.2987) 
Age Gap Provision  1.2324 0.9192 1.4560 
(1.6620) (1.4295) (1.7770) 
Unified Democratic  0.3109 0.2603 0.3471 
(0.4630) (0.4391) (0.4763) 
Unified Republican  0.1554 0.1269 0.1758 
(0.3624) (0.3331) (0.3808) 
Observations 1,872 780 1,092 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Annual Regulation Data. Standard deviations in paren-
theses. Sources: Effective Minimum Wage: Department of Labor, Wage and Hours Division,
Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm Employment Under State Law: Selected Years
1968 to 2011; Right-to-Work: Statistical Abstract of the United States; Rest and Meal Break:
U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division and state labor departments; No Fault
Divorce: Vlosky and Monroe, 2002; Age Gap Provision: Lewin Group, 2004; Statutory Rape:
A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements.
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Table 5 provides the summary statistics for the full sample, no-carry states, and carry-over
states. An important assumption of our identification strategy is that no-carry states look
somewhat similar to states without such restrictions. As most states adopted their no-
carry restrictions with their original constitutions, there are good reasons to believe their
presence should be unrelated to other factors affecting regulatory activity. A joint test of
the difference in means between the control group variables for no-carry and carry states
confirms this intuition. The null hypothesis of a difference in means between groups of
states is rejected at the ten percent level.
We estimate the effects of partisanship on regulation in (8) and the possible enhancing effect
of no-carry restrictions on regulation in (9):
rst = α + βDDemocraticst + βRRepublicanst +
∑
j
γjStateV ariablej,st + λt + νst (8)
rst = α + βDDemocraticst + βRRepublicanst + φDDemocraticst ×NoCarrys
· · ·+ βRRepublicanst ×NoCarrys + µNoCarrys +
∑
j
γjStateV ariablej,st + λt + νst (9)
The regulation variable rst is dichotomous with the exception of the Minimum Wage. Since
these dichotomous variables change at most once, state fixed effects cannot be included.12
Otherwise, the right-hand side variables in (8) and (9) are the same as in specifications (5)
and (6). The marginal effects in (9) are the same as before with the effect of a unified
government under carry-over provisions equal to βp and the effect of a unified government
under no-carry restrictions equal to βp + φp.
What is different is our hypothesis on the relationship of these marginal effects in (9).
Our election model in section II predicts that state governments constrained by fiscal rules
12We do however include a set of regional dummy variables.
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will substitute out of fiscal policy and into regulatory policy to meet voter preferences.
Therefore, we expect that Democratic state governments under no-carry restrictions to add
more regulation than Democrats under carry-over provisions H0 : βD + φD > 0. Likewise,
we expect that Republican state governments under no-carry restrictions to reduce more
regulation than Republicans without those restrictions H0 : βR + φR < 0. We test each
hypothesis using a one-tailed test.
Table 6 presents the impact of party control on individual regulatory policies. The results
support our prior that Democrats prefer more regulation while Republicans prefer less regu-
lation. Among Democrats, five of the six regulations have the expected positive sign and are
statistically significant. Among Republicans, all six regulations have the expected negative
sign although only two are statistically significant.
Table 7 presents the effect of no-carry restrictions on individual regulatory policies. As
before, we report the point estimate and standard error of each unified government under
carry-over provisions, βp, and under no-carry restrictions, βp + φp plus the p-value of the
one-tailed test that no-carry restrictions enhance partisan regulatory policy.
The results show evidence that under fiscal rules state governments substitute into regulatory
policy to meet their partisan objectives. We expect different point estimates under no-carry
states and carry-over states. In particular, we expect the point estimates to be larger and
more significant in Democratic no-carry states compared with Democratic carry-over states.
And we expect the point estimates to be more negative and more significant in Republican
no-carry states compared with Republican carry-over states. In most instances, we fail
to reject the null that Democrats under no-carry restrictions add more regulation and that
Republicans under no-carry rules reduce more regulation relative to their counterparts under
carry-over provisions. In particular, Democratic state governments pursue a higher minimum
wage, explicit minimum rest periods and no fault divorce legislation when constrained by
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Minimum 
Wage 
Closed 
Union 
Rest    
Break 
Meal    
Break 
No Fault 
Divorce 
Age Gap 
Provision 
       
Unified Democratic 0.1320**  1.3233*** 0.5542** -0.1439 0.8718** 0.3887* 
 (0.0559) (0.2935) (0.2733) (0.3166) (0.3896) (0.2024) 
       
Unified Republican -0.0331 -1.2484*** -1.6905** -0.3763 -0.2346 -0.1154 
 (0.0620) (0.3975) (0.8039) (0.3556) (0.4722) (0.2271) 
       
Estimator FE Probit Probit Probit Probit Ordered 
Probit 
Observations 1,152 1,872 1,872 1,824 864 1,872 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Time Period 1985-09 1970-09 1970-09 1970-09 1970-89 1970-09 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cross-Sectional Fixed Effects State Region Region Region Region Region 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Table 6: Partisan Impacts on Individual Regulations. Equation (8) is estimated with the
regulatory policy listed on top as the dependent variable using the estimator indicated. The
coefficient for Unified party p is βp. The coefficients for the intercept term, control variables
and time dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and
‘*’ indicate significance at the one, five and ten percent levels respectively.
fiscal rules (their support for a closed union shop is strong under both no-carry and carry-over
provisions). In contrast, Republican state governments oppose closed union shops, explicit
minimum meal periods and age gap provisions when constrained by fiscal rules.
6 Conclusion
We begin by presenting a simple theoretical model in which voters view fiscal and regulatory
instruments as substitutable means to achieving the ends of government policy. We show
that, in the presence of a fiscal constraint that binds the parties to fiscal policies that
are different than those they prefer, the parties adopt more partisan regulatory positions.
Democrats adopt platforms that call for more regulation while Republicans adopt platforms
that call for less regulation.
We then run a series of statistical tests to examine the validity of this story. In the first set of
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Minimum 
Wage 
Closed 
Union 
Rest    
Break 
Meal    
Break 
No Fault 
Divorce 
Age Gap 
Provision 
       
Unified Democratic 0.1283*  1.3642*** 0.2224 -0.3880 0.1221 0.7975*** 
under Carry-over (0.0764) (0.4689) (0.1790) (0.3437) (0.5277) (0.2953) 
Unified Democratic  0.1350**  1.3343*** 1.1720*** 0.1722 1.3700*** 0.1907 
under No-Carry (0.0672) (0.3114) (0.4224) (0.4425) (0.3887) (0.2233) 
Unified Democratic Test 0.530 0.476 0.998 0.897 0.991 0.026 
       
Unified Republican 0.0070 -0.9244** -1.3481** -0.0400 -0.3972 0.0268 
under Carry-over (0.0959) (0.3825) (0.6616) (0.4375) (0.6158) (0.3379) 
Unified Republican  -0.0580 -1.3802*** -0.8732 -1.1611** -0.0987 -0.3184 
under No-Carry (0.0675) (0.4195) (1.1577) (0.5653) (0.6146) (0.2684) 
Unified Republican Test 0.738 0.895 0.350 0.950 0.363 0.822 
       
Estimator FE Probit Probit Probit Probit Ordered 
Probit 
Observations 1,152 1,872 1,872 1,824 864 1,872 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Time Period 1985-09 1970-09 1970-09 1970-09 1970-89 1970-09 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cross-Sectional Fixed Effects State Region Region Region Region Region 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Table 7: Partisan and No-Carry Impact on Individual Regulations. Equation (9) is estimated
with the regulatory policy listed on top as the dependent variable using the estimator indicated.
The coefficient for Unified party p under Carry-over is βp and the coefficient for Unified party
p under No-Carry is βp + φp. The Unified Democratic Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test
that H0 : βD + φD > 0 and the Unified Republican Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test
that H0 : βR + φR < 0. The coefficients for the intercept term, control variables and time
dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate
significance at the one, five and ten percent levels respectively.
tests, we find strong support for partisan policy preferences. We contribute to the literature
that studies the role of political parties in government by looking at a broader range of
policies than previous studies. This allows us to confirm that parties do indeed matter
for fiscal policy. We find that Republicans do generally support budgets that decrease the
size of government, whereas Democrats favor higher taxes and spending. Furthermore, to
the extent that unified Republican governments appear to be elected in states with higher
spending and taxes and vice versa for Democrats, voters expect the parties to purse these
policies.
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Our second contribution is to show that no-carry restrictions do constrain partisan policy
preferences. This is consistent with previous literature, though we contribute to the literature
by showing this for a broader set of policies than previous researchers.
Our most intriguing result is that politicians in those states bound by fiscal policy rules
will instead substitute into regulatory efforts. We show that Democrats will pursue a higher
minimum wage, explicit minimum rest periods and no fault divorce legislation. By contrast,
Republicans who are constrained from pursuing their preferred set of fiscal policies tend to
oppose closed union shops, explicit minimum meal periods and age gap provisions more than
their unconstrained colleagues.
Our results suggest political actors use whatever policy instruments are available to them to
achieve their ends. If they are constrained along one dimension, they substitute into more-
partisan activities along the other dimension. If there is one over-arching message to our
findings, it is that voters “get what they ask for,” and this holds true even if they attempt to
bind themselves using constitutional rules. Politicians will find a way to play politics, often
in unintended ways.
References
Alt, J. E. and R. C. Lowry (1994), ‘Divided government, fiscal institutions, and budget deficits:
Evidence from the states’, The American Political Science Review 88(4), 811–828.
Alt, J. E. and R. C. Lowry (2000), ‘A dynamic model of state budget outcomes under divided
partisan government’, The Journal of Politics 62(4), 1035–1069.
Becker, G. S. (1983), ‘A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence’, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371–400.
Berry, W. D., E. J. Ringquist, R. C. Fording and R. L. Hanson (1998), ‘Measuring citizen and
government ideology in the american states, 1960-93’, American Journal of Political Science
25
42(1), 327–348.
Besley, T and A Case (2003), ‘Political institutions and policy choices: Evidence from the United
States’, Journal of Economic Literature 41(1), 7–73.
Besley, T., T. Persson and D. M. Sturm (2010), ‘Political competition, policy and growth: Theory
and evidence from the u.s.’, Review of Economic Studies 77(4), 1329–1352.
Bohn, H. and R. P. Inman (1996), Balanced budget rules and public deficits: Evidence from the
u.s. states, NBER Working Papers 5533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Brambor, T., W. R. Clark and M. Golder (2006), ‘Understanding interaction models: Improving
empirical analyses’, Political Analysis 14(1), 63–82.
Caplan, B. (2001), ‘Has leviathan been bound? a theory of imperfectly constrained government
with evidence from the states’, Southern Economic Journal 67(4), 825–847.
Coughlin, P. and S. Nitzan (1981a), ‘Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic
voting’, Journal of Economic Theory 24(2), 226–239.
Coughlin, P. and S. Nitzan (1981b), ‘Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social
welfare maxima’, Journal of Public Economics 15(1), 113–122.
Crain, M. (2003), Volatile States: Institutions, Policy, and the Performance of American State
Economies, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Drazen, A (2004), Fiscal rules from a political economy perspective, in ‘Rules-Based Fiscal Policy
in Emerging Markets: Background, Analysis and Prospects’, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Garand, J. C. (1988), ‘Explaining government growth in the u.s. states’, American Political Science
Review 82(3), 837–849.
Gilligan, T. W. and J. G. Matsusaka (1995), ‘Deviations from constituent interests: The role of
legislative structure and political parties in the states’, Economic Inquiry 33(3), 383–401.
Hinich, M. J., and P. Ordeshook (1969), ‘Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process’,
Public Choice 7(3), 81–106.
Hinich, M. J., and P. Ordeshook (1971), ‘Social welfare and electoral competition in democratic
societies’, Public Choice 11(3), 73–87.
26
Mueller, D. C. (2003), Public Choice III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Poterba, J. M. (1994), ‘State responses to fiscal crises: The effects of budgetary institutions and
politics’, The Journal of Political Economy 102(4), 799–821.
Primo, D. (2007), Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Reed, W. R. (2006), ‘Democrats, republicans, and taxes: Evidence that political parties matter’,
Journal of Public Economics 90(4-5), 725–750.
Rose, S. (2006), ‘Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?’, Public Choice 128(3/4), 407–
431.
Savage, J. D. (1990), Balanced Budgets and American Politics, Cornell University Press.
Shadbegian, R. (1996), ‘Do tax and expenditure limitations affect the size and growth of state
government?’, Contemporary Economic Policy 14(1), 22–35.
Stigler, G. J. (1971), ‘The theory of economic regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science 2(1), 3–21.
Vlosky, D.A. and P. A. Monroe (2002), ‘The effective dates of no-fault divorce laws in the 50 states’,
Family Relations 51(4), 317–24.
von Hagen, J. (1991), ‘A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints’, Journal of
Public Economics 44(2), 199–210.
Wagner, R. E. (1989), To Promote the General Welfare, The Pacific Institute, San Francisco.
Wittman, D. (1984), ‘Multi-candidate equilibria’, Public Choice 43(3), 287–291.
Yandle, B. (1983), ‘Bootleggers and baptists - the education of a regulatory economist’, Regulation
7(3), p.12.
27
Appendices    
 
     
Variable Full Sample 
Unified 
Democratic 
Unified 
Republican Split 
Log of Real Income per Worker 10.4159 10.3957 10.4164 10.4300 
 (0.1340) (0.1406) (0.1184) (0.1335) 
Unemployment Rate 5.9371 6.3712 5.0509 5.9647 
 (1.7568) (1.7210) (1.5347) (1.7444) 
Unionization Rate 16.0460 16.7776 13.7296 16.4038 
 (7.9020) (7.7840) (8.3936) (7.6642) 
Real Wage Rate 8.4260 8.2593 8.3523 8.5719 
 (1.0989) (1.1001) (1.0936) (1.0852) 
Percent in Manufacturing 0.1328 0.1358 0.1258 0.1332 
 (0.0647) (0.0631) (0.0709) (0.0635) 
Percent in Agriculture 0.0037 0.0036 0.0036 0.0037 
 (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0022) 
Percent Female 0.5101 0.5117 0.5075 0.5099 
 (0.0076) (0.0080) (0.0064) (0.0074) 
Percent Black 0.0990 0.1273 0.0618 0.0929 
 (0.0938) (0.1027) (0.0734) (0.0883) 
Percent 0-17 Years Old 0.2736 0.2767 0.2764 0.2703 
 (0.0347) (0.0359) (0.0353) (0.0334) 
Percent 65+ Years Old 0.1198 0.1170 0.1220 0.1209 
 (0.0199) (0.0215) (0.0213) (0.0181) 
Log of Population Density 4.4039 4.6587 3.9964 4.3775 
 (1.3057) (1.1860) (1.4114) (1.3088) 
Budget Deficit (lagged) -0.0597 -0.0354 -0.0352 -0.0862 
 (0.4237) (0.1128) (0.1389) (0.5983) 
Federal Transfers (lagged) 0.6759 0.5447 0.7725 0.7323 
 (0.5427) (0.4807) (0.4755) (0.5906) 
Lame Duck Governor 0.2828 0.3221 0.2672 0.2609 
 (0.4446) (0.4629) (0.4393) (0.4332) 
Citizen Ideology 48.9885 48.8010 45.8480 50.3094 
 (15.5677) (17.8940) (10.8086) (15.1993) 
Government Ideology 52.9566 63.5169 35.6379 52.0235 
 (11.9831) (6.2756) (7.8134) (7.4410) 
Observations 480 163 87 230 
 
Appendix A: Descriptive statistics for control variables. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Sources: Log Real Income per Worker: BEA Regional Economic Accounts; Unemployment
rate: BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics; Unionization rate: Hirsch and Macpherson,
Unionstat.com for 1983-2010 and past issues of BNA Union Membership and Earnings Data
Book; Real Wage Rate: BLS State and Metro Area Employment, Hours, Earnings; Percent in
Manufacturing and in Agriculture: BEA Regional Economic Accounts; Percent Female, Black,
0-17 and 65+: Census Population Estimates by State; Log of Population Density: Census
Population Estimates by State; Budget Deficit and Federal Transfers: Census Bureau State
Government Finances; Lame Duck Governor: National Conference of State Legislators State
and Legislative Partisan Composition and Statistical Abstract of the United States; Citizen
and Government Ideology: Berry et al., 1998 updates.
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